ManageMyHealth Ransomware: A Blueprint of the NZ Healthcare Breach
In late December 2025, while most of New Zealand was winding down for the holidays, a quiet crisis was unfolding.
ManageMyHealth, the country’s largest patient portal, became the target of a high-stakes digital shakedown. This wasn't a "noisy" attack that crashed systems; it was a surgical theft of the most private information a person can own.
At ZyberWalls, we’re calling this Ransomware 3.0. The attackers didn't just want to stop doctors from working—they wanted to weaponize access to medical histories at a massive scale.
Our Perspective: This analysis is built on public disclosures, court filings, and the patterns we’re seeing across the threat landscape. While we aren't the boots-on-the-ground investigators for this specific case, the "fingerprints" left behind tell a clear and cautionary story.
1. The "Holiday Ambush" Timeline
Cybercriminals target "Skeleton Crew" periods when IT response times are traditionally slower.
Dec 30, 2025: The breach is detected. Unauthorized access is identified within the "Health Documents" environment.
Jan 1–3, 2026: The scale becomes clear. Roughly 126,000 users (7% of the portal) had their files accessed.
Jan 4, 2026: The extortion group "Kazu" turns up the heat on Telegram. They move the ransom deadline up to Jan 6—a move designed to intensify leverage and force a panicked decision.
Jan 6, 2026 (Today): The reported $60,000 USD deadline has passed. ManageMyHealth has secured a High Court Injunction to restrict the spread of data, but the long-term privacy impact is now difficult to contain.
2. Why This is "Ransomware 3.0"
The "Kazu" group represents a fundamental shift in cyber-extortion. They’ve realized that stealing data is often more profitable (and quieter) than locking it up.
The "Silent" Weapon: There was no encryption. Patients could still log in, and doctors could still see records. The leverage wasn't downtime; it was the threat of 108GB of sensitive photos and notes being leaked.
Evergreen Risk: You can change a leaked password or cancel a credit card. You cannot cancel a diagnosis, a mental health note, or a clinical photo. This data stays valuable for blackmail and identity theft indefinitely.
This approach mirrors a growing global trend where attackers trade visibility for persistence, and chaos for leverage.
3. How They Got In: Modeling the "Side Doors"
We don't have the internal forensic logs, but based on how these portals are built and how groups like Kazu operate, we can model the most likely entry points.
A. The "Unchecked ID" (API Vulnerabilities)
In many modern breaches, attackers bypass the "front door" login entirely. They target the APIs—the "pipes" that move data between the database and your screen.
This often involves a BOLA (Broken Object-Level Authorization) exploit. Imagine being able to see someone else’s medical file just by changing one digit in a web address—that’s how these "silent" extractions frequently occur.
B. The "Orphaned" Subdomain
Large platforms often have old "test" or "legacy" websites that aren't used anymore but are still connected to the internet.
These are like unlocked back windows. If an attacker takes over an "orphaned" subdomain, they can host malicious scripts on a site that looks like a "trusted" part of the company.
C. The DMARC Gap (The Trust Problem)
Analysis suggests the domain might have been using a "Monitoring Only" (p=none) email policy.
Such configurations are frequently abused in spear-phishing campaigns. By impersonating a trusted admin, attackers can more easily gain the credentials needed to access sensitive document repositories.
4. What Was Taken? (The Impact Map)
Kazu claims to have 108GB of what we call "Evergreen Data."
| Data Type | Volume | Impact |
| Medical Documents | 428,337 files | High (Permanent privacy violation) |
| Identity Scans | Passport / ID scans | Critical (Long-term identity theft risk) |
| Diagnostic Meta-data | API logs / audit trails | Medium (Fuel for future phishing) |
5. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
The following mapping reflects inferred tactics based on public indicators and common extortion workflows, not confirmed forensic attribution.
| Tactic | Technique | Inferred Behavior |
| Initial Access | Exploit Public-Facing App (T1190) | Targeting specific application modules or APIs. |
| Credential Access | Valid Accounts (T1078) | Use of credentials likely harvested from third-party leaks. |
| Collection | Data from Info Repositories (T1213) | Automated scraping of file storage modules. |
| Exfiltration | Exfiltration Over Web Service (T1567) | Transfer of data via standard HTTPS protocols to evade detection. |
6. SOC Defender’s Playbook: Turning Insight into Action
To prevent a "Kazu-style" exfiltration event, ZyberWalls recommends:
Stop the Impersonators: Move your email policy from "Monitoring" to p=reject. If the email isn't from your domain, it shouldn't be delivered.
Watch the "Suitcases": Implement egress rate limiting. Set up alerts for any account that tries to download more than 50 files in 10 minutes.
Add Step-Up MFA: Require re-authentication specifically when accessing sensitive document vaults, not just at the initial login.
Audit Your DNS: Regularly scan for and decommission "orphaned" subdomains to prevent takeover attacks.
Final Verdict
The ManageMyHealth incident is a global reminder: In 2026, the strongest defense isn't a louder alert—it's Data Resilience. When trust is exfiltrated, recovery isn’t measured in days—it’s measured in years.
Stay Technical. Stay Human. Stay Safe.
— The ZyberWalls Research Team
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